Brazil 1970: how five number 10s won the World Cup

By the All Eras XI team · Updated 12 November 2026

Brazil won the 1970 World Cup by winning all six matches, ending with a 4-1 victory over Italy in Mexico City on 21 June. Their enduring appeal lies in how Mário Zagallo organised an extraordinary collection of creators into a team whose greatest moments belonged to several players at once.

Zagallo’s inheritance

João Saldanha had taken Brazil through qualification, but lost his job before the finals. Zagallo arrived with little preparation time: FIFA’s account places his appointment just 75 days before the tournament began. A coaching change so close to a World Cup could have encouraged caution. Instead, Brazil built a side around an unusually large concentration of attacking intelligence.

Zagallo had already won the World Cup as a player in 1958 and 1962. His task in 1970 was to make the talents of Pelé, Gérson, Rivellino, Tostão and Jairzinho complement one another. The familiar description of five “number 10s” captures their creative authority. It also invites the wrong assumption that they all wanted to stand in the same place.

They shared an ability to invent, but had different work to do. The lesson of this side, among the teams in our football history collection, is that selection and organisation are inseparable. Having exceptional footballers gave Zagallo options; deciding how they should connect made those options useful.

The structure beneath the freedom

The final’s starting side was Félix; Carlos Alberto, Brito, Piazza and Everaldo; Clodoaldo and Gérson; Jairzinho, Pelé, Tostão and Rivellino. That list offers a starting point rather than a complete tactical diagram. In possession, Brazil’s positions changed as players approached the ball or moved into the space a colleague had opened.

Zagallo moved Piazza from midfield into central defence, giving the build-up another accomplished passer. Clodoaldo supplied a central reference point ahead of the back line. Gérson could organise from deeper areas, while Jairzinho attacked from the right. Rivellino offered another creative route from the left, with Pelé and Tostão connecting the attack centrally.

The full-backs could provide width as the attackers moved inside. These relationships mattered more than deciding whether a still image showed 4-3-3 or 4-2-4. The formations guide offers a way into that distinction: a starting shape describes where players begin, while the usefulness of the shape depends on the passing options they create.

Three different group-stage tests

Brazil began against Czechoslovakia on 3 June. Ladislav Petráš put the Czechoslovaks ahead, but Rivellino equalised before Pelé and two Jairzinho goals completed a 4-1 win. The opening deficit is a useful corrective to the idea of an effortless procession. Brazil had to recover before their attacking superiority became visible in the score.

The England match on 7 June supplied a much narrower examination. Gordon Banks produced his famous save from Pelé’s downward header, recovering across his goal and turning the bouncing ball over the bar. Pelé’s execution and Banks’s response belong in the same memory: an exceptional chance met an exceptional piece of goalkeeping.

England were the defending champions and made Brazil work for the breakthrough. Jairzinho eventually scored the only goal after Pelé laid the ball across to him. The 1-0 result showed a different form of authority from the opening win. Brazil could take a closely contested match through a decisive combination rather than overwhelm an opponent with a succession of goals.

Romania then lost 3-2 on 10 June, with Pelé scoring twice and Jairzinho once. Brazil finished top of their group with three victories. Across those matches they had won after conceding first, won by a single goal against the holders, and protected an advantage against opponents who scored twice.

Peru and Uruguay on the road to the final

Peru made the quarter-final a contest of attacking quality. Rivellino and Tostão gave Brazil an early lead; Alberto Gallardo replied, Tostão scored again, and Teófilo Cubillas brought Peru back within a goal. Jairzinho’s finish settled a 4-2 victory on 14 June. Tostão’s two goals were a reminder that a forward’s contribution to combination play could sit alongside decisive finishing.

Uruguay presented another problem in the semi-final on 17 June. Luis Cubilla scored first, and Brazil needed Clodoaldo’s equaliser before half-time. Jairzinho and Rivellino supplied the second-half goals in a 3-1 win. Brazil reached the final having answered another deficit, with the scoring shared beyond their most famous player.

Jairzinho’s sequence now extended through every round. He had scored twice in the opening match and once in each subsequent fixture. His running and finishing gave Brazil a repeated route to goal while the combination around him changed. That consistency helps explain why the side’s history belongs to more than a collection of Pelé highlights.

Italy, 4-1, and a goal that explains the team

The final at the Estadio Azteca was level at half-time. Pelé opened the scoring in the 18th minute, but Roberto Boninsegna equalised in the 37th. The eventual margin can obscure that interval score. Italy remained in the match until Brazil’s second-half goals turned a balanced scoreline into a commanding victory.

Gérson restored the lead in the 66th minute. Jairzinho made it 3-1 in the 71st, completing his record of scoring in all six Brazil matches and taking his tournament total to seven. Carlos Alberto added the fourth in the 86th. Each Brazilian scorer represented a different part of the side: its central star, its midfield organiser, its recurring attacking threat and its advancing captain.

Carlos Alberto’s goal makes the most persuasive tactical argument. Clodoaldo’s work in midfield began the famous passage through Rivellino, Jairzinho and Pelé before the right-back arrived to finish. The attack drew on players across the team and ended with someone coming from deeper territory. Its beauty came from the relationship between the passes and the run.

FIFA’s account of Zagallo’s preparation adds a revealing detail: Jairzinho had been instructed to open space for Carlos Alberto against Giacinto Facchetti’s man-marking. The finish therefore joined individual judgement to a rehearsed idea. It rewards the same attention to complementary duties explored in our position-by-position guide.

Why the reference point endures

This was Brazil’s third world title, following 1958 and 1962, so they earned permanent possession of the Jules Rimet Trophy. Mexico 1970 was also the first World Cup broadcast in colour. That is a claim about the tournament’s television coverage, rather than a suggestion that every household watched it on a colour set.

The lasting argument for Brazil rests on the football: six victories, answers to difficult opponents, and a final goal in which collective movement made individual skill more effective. They remain a reference point because the results and the method reinforce each other. The team offers something concrete to study whenever a talented attack seems harder to organise than to select.

In All Eras XI

The Brazil 1970 squad appears in All Eras XI. Pelé offers goal threat and creativity at centre-forward, Gérson supplies creativity from central midfield, and Carlos Alberto gives you a strong defensive option at right-back. Think about the balance between those duties when drafting. Read about World Cup Legends for the international-team setting, or use how to play to follow the drafting process.